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Introduction
Introduction

Positioning technologies such as GPS. GSM,
GSM? RF-ID and
WiFi(802. 1 J) have undergone rapid developments in recent
WiFi(802.11)
[ I 9: 21, 7].
71. These new technologies allow locations
years [19,
of users to be determined accurately, and enable a new class
of applications known as Location-Based Services
Services (LBS).
(LBS).
An important LBS is the E-91l
E-91 1 application mandated by
the U.S. (correspondingly E-I
E- I 12
I2 in Europe), which requires
cell phone companies to provide an accurate (within a few
hundred feet) location of a cell phone user that calls for
emergency help [7].
[7]. Another example is the use of RF-ID
tags on items such as razors in large
la]-gedepartmental stores for
inventory management [2
[2 1].
1 1.
Although LBS applications hold the promise of safety,
convenience,
convenience: and new business opportunities, the ability to
locate users and items accurately also raises a new concernconcern -

intrusion of location
locntio~lprivacy. According to [2],
[2]: location privacy is defined as "the ability to prevent other parties from
learning one's current or past location". Using locationing
technologies. a service provider can track the whereabouts
technologies.
of a user and discover her personal habits. These pieces of
sensitive information can be sold to unknown third parties.
It is often feared that government agencies can monitor the
behavior of individuals,
individuals, the places they have visited. etc.
etc.
Preventing location privacy from being invaded is thus of
utmost
~
~ t m oimportance.
st
Recently several solutions for location privacy protection
have been proposed. Some researchers suggest the use of
"policies",
"policies", in which the service provider is required to state
explicitly how user'S
information can be used [20.
~ ~ s e rlocation
's
[20:
10,
"cloaks" her information
10: 9].
91. In another proposal, a user "cloaks"
before sending it to the LBS,
LBS: by providing her location at a
lower resolution in terms of time and space [7,
[7, 2].
21. In other
words, rather than giving a precise location and time instant,
words.
a larger region covered in a time frame is reported. This
solution.
solution: also known as location
locntiorl cloaking,
cloakirzg, provides the user
with more flexibility in controlling her information. We will
study it extensively in this paper.
By reducing the granularity of spatial and temporal information.
user's privacy to be be
formation, location cloaking allows a user's
better protected. Unfortunately, this scheme can also reduce
the quality of service provided by the LBS. This is simply
because the LBS does not have the most accurate information to provide the best service. Consider a remote cab service that allows a subscriber to call for a cab nearby. If
If the
subscriber reports her precise location, the service provider
can find her the closest cab, and can tell the cab driver how
to reach the customer. However, if only a vague location
is given.
given, it may take more time for a cab to reach the custradeoff among:
among:
tomer. Indeed.
Indeed, for such a scheme, there is a tradeoff
(I)
( I ) How uncertain the location information sent by a user to
the LBS is. (2) the location privacy of the user, and (3) the
service quality. In this paper, we propose a framework designed for moving-object environments. The model takes
into account these three factors,
factors, allowing us
LIS to have a better

understanding of their interaction. We also present a formal
quailmodel for cloaked locations,
locations. and provide metrics for quantifying privacy of location cloaking.
We then investigate the role of the location-cloaking
framework for non-anonymous
non-anonymous application,
application: where the
owner of the location is reported to the service provider.
provider,
in addition to the location data itself. We choose this type
of applications because existing techniques usually focus
on anonymity or pseudonymity of the users' identities,
identities. and
it is not clear how they can be applied to non-anonymous
noii-anonymous
solutions. Moreover, non-anonymous location-based appliapplications post extra difficulties in privacy protection due to
the fact that the owner of the location is also known to the
service provider.
A non-anonymous
lion-anonymous query studied extensively in this pamoving range
r-o,rge quely
q~lery(MRQ),
(MRQ), where a user is noper is the 1novi11g
froiii
tified any object of interest within a fixed distance from
her cun'ent
cun-ent location.
location. This query is well studied in spatial14, 15]).
temporal database literature (e.g.,r
(e.g.:[14.
151). Here we study
an "imprecise"
"imprecise" version of moving range query, namely
IMRQ. Essentially,
Essentially, an IMRQ processes cloaked locations
instead of precise locations. Moreover,
Moreover, since the location
of the query issuer is also inexact, the query itself
itself also carinfol.lnation. Due to the uncertainty of the
ries uncertain information.
query and data, the query result is "imprecise",
"in~precise", and probaexanbilistic guarantees are augmented to the answers.
answers. For exam{ ( S I :0.4),
0.4): (5
( S2z,O.8)}
: 0.8)) means that
ple, an answer for IMRQ: {(51'
users 51
S1 and 52
S2 have probabilities of 0.4 and 0.8 respectively of satisfying the query.
query. We develop query processing
algorithms for computing probabilistic answers for IMRQ,
based on spatial database techniques.
We also study the quality metric of IMRQ, in order to
quantify the ambiguity due to the inexactness of cloaked location data. We define two different metrics, one based on
uncertainty in the database, and the other based on the amambiguity of the query. These scoring metrics can be used to
quantify the quality of a service, allowing the user to decide
whether she should adjust the granularity of her cloaked location information in order to attain a better service.
service. Extensive simulations
simulations are performed to study how these quality
metrics fare in a moving-object environment
environment.
Finally, we address the issues of inference attacks, where
future locations can be inferred based on
011 tracing movement
in the past. We study modifications to our approach in order
to prevent the linkability between a user's identity and locations from being increased,
increased. thereby reducing the impact of
this kind
lund of threats.
To summarize, our major contributions are:
• A framework that relates location cloaking, privacy
and quality of service;
metrics;
• A formal model of cloaking and privacy nietrics:

• An evaluation algorithm for IMRQ that manipulates
cloaked data;
data:
• Quality metrics for IMRQ based on data and query imprecision;
• Experimental results for the proposed scheme: and

scheme.
• Inference attacks and protection for the scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We propose a framework to capture data uncertainty, privacy and
quality of service in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally
present the definitions of non-anonymous applications,
applications: location privacy, cloaking and service quality. Section 4
presents a querying algorithm, and Section 5 describes service quality metrics for moving-range queries. Experimental results are presented in Section 6.
6. Section 7 investigates
the problems of location inference and their corresponding
solutions. Related works are presented in Section 8.
8. We
conclude the paper in Section 9.
9.

2

A Framework for
for Balancing Privacy and
Service Quality

Let us now describe a system model that connects privacy, cloaked information and service quality. It forms the
basis for subsequent discussions.
Figure I1 illustrates this framework. Its main idea is to allow the user to specify her location, service request and privacy requirements to the cloaking agent, which then produces the cloaked location and an "imprecise"
"imprecise" service request
quest. On receiving these pieces of information, the service
provider processes the request and sends back the service
and feedback to the user.
Inside the cloaking agent,
agent, the policy translator produces a cloaked location (i.e., a larger region) based on the
(precise) location of the user as well as her privacy requirements, which can be specified using some high-level lanments?
guages such as EPAL [lJ
[I] and P3P [6].
[6]. For instance, if the
user's requirement is "generate a cloaked location that covX",
ers five
" , the policy transfive buildings when I am in Area X
lator produces the corresponding cloaked location when it
detects the user is in Area X. The cloaked location produced is then directed to the service translator.
Based on the cloaked location and the service request,
the service translator produces an "imprecise"
"imprecise" service request.
quest. For example, the MRQ is a service request from
the user, and the service translator transforms the MRQ to
IMRQ, an imprecise service request that processes cloaked
location data. Both the cloaked location and the imprecise
service request are then shipped to the imprecise service
processor, which stores the cloaked location in a spatialtemporal database and processes the service request
request. Since
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Figure 1. Managing
Managing Privacy and Service Quality with Cloaking Agent.

location values are imprecise, the service processor produces a "probabilistic service result"
resultt i.e., answers are augmented with probability to indicate the confidence of their
[3]. For example, the result of IMRQ contains
presence [3).
user names together with their probabilities. In addition,
a score indicating the quality of the service is generated.
These technical issues are detailed in Sections 4 and S.
5.
Both the probabilistic service result and the quality score
can be transferred directly to the user, or optionally to the
result translator
result
translator inside the cloaking agent. The main purpose of the result translator is to hide the technical details
of the probabilistic service result (e.g., probability, quality scores), and converts the answers to a higher-level form
that even casual users can understand. For example, for an
IMRQ, the translator can choose to return only the names
for which there is a high confidence (e.g.,
(e.g.. Pj
pj > 0.8)
0.8) and not
return any probability value. It can also describe to the user
the quality as LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH for quality score
ranges between [0,
[0: 0.2]'
0.21, [0.2,0.8]'
[0.2.0.8],[0.8,
[0.8: 1]
11 respectively, instead of requiring the user to interpret the numerical values.
Based on the recommendation
recomniendation from the cloaking agent, the
user can then decide if the degree of privacy should be reduced.
duced.

Privacy, Cloaking, and Service Quality
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In this section, we outline the classification of LBS,
based on which non-anonymous applications are defined.
We then explore a formal
formal model of location cloaking,
- based
on which privacy is defined.

3.1

Classification of Location-based Services

to how
An LBS application can be classified according to
the identity of the owner of the location information is disclosed along with the location information. In general, there
are three classes of LBS applications [2]:
[2]:
I. Anonymous: This application class works with location information
inforination only, and does not require a user's

identity. For example, in querying a LBS about the
price of a coffee when approaching a coffee shop,
shop: a
user only needs to supply her location to the LBS.
2. Pseudonymous:
2.
Pseudonymous: This type of applications needs to
know the identity of a user, but it can use the user's
user's
pseudonym, rather than her real identity. An examexaniple is: "When I walk past a computer kiosk.
kiosk, display
my emails".
pseudonym,
emails". The LBS can use the user's pseudonyni.
rather than her real name. to retrieve her emails.
eniails.
3. Non-Anonymous:
Non-Anonymous: This application class does not
work without knowing a user's true identity. A typical example is: "When
"When I1 am inside the building, let my
project groupmates
groupniates know where I1 am".
These three classes of applications are arranged in the asascending order of the
thDe amount of information ab;ut
about the owner
of the location information is disclosed. The more the information is disclosed, the higher is the risk to the intrusion
of privacy. We are interested in studying the protection of
non-anonymous applications,
applications, which involves
privacy for non-anonymous
privacy-related information than the other two service
more privacy-related
classes.
Our framework, however,
however, is not limited to nonanonymous applications -- it can be applied to anonymous
anonyinous
or pseudonymous
pseudonyinous applications as well.

3.2 Protecting Privacy by Cloaking
A non-anonymous application is defined formally as folfollows.
lows.
Definition
Non-anonymous
Application:
aCI
Definition1 Non-anon~mous
user
supplies
to
the
service
provider
a
tuple
'ISer
provider a
(UserID, L
L(t),
t, where
UserID
( t ) ,request)
reques t, at time
"lne
lvhere
is the identity
L(t)
idetariry of
of the user and
atld L
( t ) is the location
locariotz of
of the
user at time
rirne t with coordinates
coordit~ates(x(t),
( x ( t ) yy(t)).
: ( t ) ) . On receiving
receivir~g
this tuple,
service yraviderprocesses
provider processes the reques
tuple, the set-vice
requestt and
arid
returns
rerut-11sthe service results to the usel:
user:
tl

When a service provider receives the request, it can associate the identity of the user (UserID)
( U s e r I D ) with her current
location L(t).
L(t). By correlating L
L(t)
( t ) with a map, it is easy to
obtain the region the user is in. If
sensitive [8],
[8],
If the area is serzsitive
e.g.,
leader, the user's
e.g.? a hospital or the house of a political leader,
privacy may be threatened, since this information can be
sold to third parties without the user's consent.
user's
consent. The user.s
identity is said to have a high degree of "linkability" with
inkabiJity" in [17]).
her location (using
(using the definition of "I
"linkability"
[17]).
The purpose of protecting privacy for non-anonymous
applications is to reduce the degree of linkability.
linkability. One way
to do this is to require the service provider to state its policies of using the user's location information
inforination [20,
[20, 10,
10, 9].
91.
However,
However, this places the burden of privacy protection to serservice providers, and it is often doubtful whether these policies are enforced adequately. Even if these policies are imin)plemented correctly, location privacy can still be breached
if attackers obtain this information
inforination through the communicacommunication channel. In this paper we use a complementary techcloakirlg, where the user takes a better control
nique called cloaking,
over linkability by adjusting the degree of accuracy of the
spatial
spatial information sent to the service provider [7,2].
[7, 21. Let us
S1: 52,
Sz:...
. . . ,: 5".
S,,.
assuine the system has nn. users with names 51,
assume
L; (t). We can
Also, the current location of each user 5;
S , is Li(t).
define cloaking as follows.
Definition 2 Cloaking:
Definition
Cloaking: A user 5S,i reports to the service
provider a closed region
regiotl called uncertainty
~itzcertainr).region,
region, denoted
provider
Ui(t),
such that L,(t)
L;(t) is inside
U, (t), slich
irlside U;(t).
U,(t).
When the service provider receives
receives the uncertainty region,
gion, it perceives that each point of the region has an equal
chance of being the user's true location i.e.,
i.e., the probability
density function (pdf)
(pdf) of the user's location within the uncertainty region is Area(r;,(t))
Area~U;(t))' ' Hence the service provider
does not know the user's precise location. Unless stated
otherwise, we also assume that the uncertainty region information received by the server does not change until new
location data is reported. Figure 2 shows
shows the difference between an exact location and a cloaked location. It also illustrates that the user's location is uniformly distributed within
the region from the service provider's perspective.

3.3

Measuring Privacy of Cloaking

By "injecting" different amount of spatial uncertainty to
her location, cloaking provides a simple way for a user to
control the release of her private information to untrusted
parties. The degree of privacy can be measured in two ways:
ways:
(i)
(i) size of uncertainty region and (ii)
(ii) coverage of sensitive
area.
1.
1. Size of
o f uncertainty region. By providing a larger
uncertainty region, the spatial resolution
resolution of a location is
reduced, making the user's location more difficult to be
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guessed. The size of the uncertainty region can thus be
used to reflect the degree of privacy: the larger the region
size, the more the privacy.
privacy.
2. Coverage of
o f sensitive region. The second means of
quantifying privacy depends on the location
location of the user. To
see this,
fixed.
this. assume the size of the uncertainty region is fixed.
Suppose the user is inside a hospital (which she does not
want people to know about this),
this): and her uncertainty region
has a fraction of 90% overlap with the hospital. One can
hand, if the
easily guess she is in the hospital. On the other hand.
mall, she may not be very concerned
user is shopping in a mall,
even if her location is known.
known.
From this example,
example, we can see that whether the user's
located in a "sensitive region"
(e.g., hospital, nightclub) afafregion'' (e.g.,
privacy. Based on
fects the degree of privacy.
011 this observation,
observation. we
define the "coverage"
Si as folfol"coverage" of sensitive region for user 8;
lows:
overa2e =
Coverage
=
C
~

S, n
n U;(t))
ui ( t ) )
Area(sensitive regions of 8;
Area(U;(t))
Area(U,(t))

(J)

(1)

In general, the higher the coverage, the lower the privacy.
privacy.
In the previous example,
90%, and thus the
example, the coverage is 90%,
user can be easily guessed that she is in the hospital. Thus
the uncertainty region should be enlarged in order to assure
that the user's location cannot be easily associated with a
sensitive region.
region.
It is also worth mention that the definition
definition of sensitive
user-specific. For example, while for a physician
region is user-specific.
physician
a hospital
hospital may not be a sensitive region, the same cannot be
said about a patient.

3.4

Cloaking and Service Quality

Although cloaking lessens the threat to location privacy,
it can affect
qualify of service provided. In particular.
particular,
affect the quality
since the service provider does not receive accurate location
information, it may be impossible for it to provide a good
service. For example,
example, suppose a user wants to know who is
her nearest neighbor,
neighbor, and her cloaked location is supplied.

Then
Then there
there can
can be
be more
more than
than one
one answer
answer that
that satisfies
satisfies her
her
query,
unable toto get
get aa precise
precise answer.
answer.
query, and
and the
the user
user may
may be
be unable
Next
Next we
we study
study the
the technical
technical details
details of
of querying
querying cloaked
cloaked lolocations
cations and
and measuring
measuring query
query quality.
quality.

44 Evaluation
Evaluation of
of Imprecise
Imprecise Queries
Queries
In
In this
this section,
section, we
we study
study the
the teclmicaJ
technical details
details of
of the
the evalevaluating
uating cloaked
cloaked locations
locations inin aa database
database system.
system. We
We first
first disdiscuss
cusshow
how aatraditional
traditional query
querycan
can be
be"transfonned"
"transformed" totoaaquery
query
that
thathandles
handlescloaked
cloaked infonnation.
information. We
Wethen
then illustrate
illustrate how
how the
the
query
query can
can be
be evaluated
evaluated inin aaspatial
spatialdatabase.
database. We
We also
alsoexamexamine
ine the
the quality
quality of
of moving
moving range
range queries.
queries. The
The moving
movit~grange
ratlye
query
query isis used
used as
asaarunning
running example.
example.

(a)
Figure3.
3. Moving
MovingRange
RangeQuery
Query using
using(a)
(a)exact
exact
Figure
locations,
(b)cloaked
cloakedlocations.
locations.
locations,and
and(b)

4.1
4.1 Precise
Precise and
and Imprecise
ImpreciseQueries
Queries
Intuitively,
Intuitively, aa moving
moving range
range query
query isisaa range
range query
query whose
whose
"range"
"range" depends
depends on
on the
the position
position of
of the
the user.
user. For
For example,
example.
aa user
user may
may specify
specify that
that she
she wants
wants toto be
be notified
notified of
of any
any of
of
her
fromher.
her. The
Thereader
reader isis
her friend
friend who
who isiswithin
within ten
ten meters
metersfrom
reminded
reminded that
that although
although here
here we
weassume
assumeaarange
range query
query has
liasaa
circular
circular shape
shape our
our methods
methods can
can be
be applied
applied toto range
range queries
queries
with
with any
any geometric
geometric shape.
shape.
Let
be the
the set
set of
of users
users inin which
which 5i
Si isis interested,
interested, and
and
Let F1;i1be
let
letrir;be
bethe
theradius
radiusof
of the
thecircle
circlewith
withLLi i(t)
( t )asasthe
thecenter.
center. We
We
can
candefine
define aa moving
moving range
range query
query as
asfollows.
follows.
Definition
Definition33 Given
Given aa user
user 5Si
with pnrameters
pratnerets F;,
Fi,LLii (t)
(t)
i with
and
a t ~ ri,
dri, aa Moving
Moving Range
Range Query
Query (MRQ)
(MRQ) returns
returt~s{5
{ Sj lj
j1 j ==
1,1 ...
; .. .,n},
: n ) ,such
S L I C that
~tlzot 5Sj j EE F
Fi,
atzd 5Sj j has
has aa distance
distance less
less
i , and
than
tho11ririunitsjrom
utzirs from 5Si
at time
timet.t.
i at

Figure 3(a)
3(a) illustrates
illustrates aa MRQ.
MRQ. ]fIf we
we assume
assume FF1
Figure
1 ==
{52,
53,
54}'
then
54
is
returned
as
the
only
answer.
Note
( S 2 :5'3: S 4 ) :then S q is returned as the only answer. Note
that
that toto answer
answer MRQ,
MRQ, the
the system
system needs
needs toto know
know both
both the
the
location
location and
and identity
identity of
of each
each user
user so
so that
that the
the query
query can
can be
be
answered.
thus aanon-anonymous
non-anonymousquery.
query. Further,
Further, when
when
answered. ItItisisthus
aa user
user submits
subinits aa MRQ,
MRQ, the
the user
user needs
needs toto submit
submit her
her name
name
inin addition
addition toto her
her current
current position,
position, so
so that
that only
only the
the names
names
of
returned. As
As discussed
discussed
of the
the people
people of
of interest
interest toto her
her are
are returned.
inin the
the last
lastsection,
section,privacy
privacy can
can be
be threatened
threatened since
since both
both the
the
identity
identity and
andthe
the location
location information
informationare
aresupplied
suppliedtotothe
theserservice
vice provider.
provider.
Location
Locationcloaking
cloakingcan
can alleviate
alleviatethe
the threat
threat totoprivacy.
privacy. InInstead
stead of
of supplying
supplying exact
exact locations,
locations, users
users only
only supply
supply their
their
cloaked
cloaked locations.
locations. We
Wecall
callthe
theversion
versionof
ofMRQ
MRQthat
thatemploys
employs
cloaked
Imprecise Moving
Moving Range
Range
cloaked location
location information
information Imprecise
Query.
Query. The
The word
word "imprecise"
"in~precise"arises
arises from
from the
the fact
fact that
that the
the
query
query isis made
made ambiguous
ambiguous by
by imposing
imposing uncertain
uncertain informainformation
tion on
on the
the location
location of
of the
the user
user submitting
submitting the
the query.
query. ItIt isis
formally
formally defined
definedbelow:
below:

Definition44 Given
Givetiaauser
usel-5;
Si with
withparameters
paratneters FFi,
Ui(t)
(t.)and
and
Definition
i , U;
Ti,
ri, an
an Imprecise
Imprecise Moving
Moving Range
Range Query
Query (lMRQ)
(IMRQ) returns
returns

set oj
oftuples
f~iples
{ ( Sj ,,pj)lj
,I),) 1 j == 1.1.....
. . . .n}.
n.), where
wliere 5Sj
{(5
ao set
j EE FFi,
i,
and
5Sij has
atzd Pj
pj >
> D0isisthe
the non-zero
tzot7-zeroprobability
p r o b a b i l i ~that
that user
~lser
hasaa
5Si
distance
clistat7celess
lessthal1
tho17r;r ,lInitsji'O/ll
~itiitsfiotl~
o ftime
fitnet.t.
i Of

Figure 3(b)
3(b) shows
shows aa scenario
scenario where
where an
an IMRQ
IMRQ isis
Figure
computed
computed over
over cloaked
cloaked locations,
locations. with
with range
range queries
queries isisFor
sued
For Qj,
Q1, the
the
sued atat two
two different
different locations
locations inin UCTl(t).
j (t).
answer
{ ( S2,D.2),(5
2 0.2);
:
( S33,D.6),
:0.6).(Sj,D.7)},
(S.,
,0.7)), while
while for
for the
the
answer isis {(5
Q 2 :the
the answer
answer isis {(5
{ ( S3,D.9),
3 0.9):
: (54,
( S 4I)}.
:1 ) ) . After
After considerconsiderQ2,
ing
ing the
the probabilities
probabilities of
of the
the objects
objects satisfying
satisfying the
the range
range
( t ) ,the
the answer
answer
queries issued
issued atat all
all possible
possible points
points inin UUl
queries
j (t),
{ ( S 2D.l),
0.1);
. (53,
( S 3D.7),
:0.7):(54'
( S 4D.9)}
.0 . 9 ) )isis returned.
returned. The
The probabiliprobabili{(52,
ties inin the
the answer
answer allow
allow the
the user
user toto place
place appropriate
appropriate conficonfities
denceininthe
theanswer,
answer,which
which isisthe
theconsequence
consequenceof
ofevaluating
evaluating
dence
cloaked
cloaked(or
(orimprecise)
imprecise)location
location values.
values. Depending
Dependingupon
upon the
the
requirements
requirements of
of the
the application,
application, one
one may
may choose
choose toto report
report
only
onlythe
theobject
objectwith
withthe
thekk highest
highestprobability
probability value,
value,or
oronly
only
those
those objects
objects whose
whose probability
probability values
values exceed
exceed aa minimum
minimum
threshold.
threshold. Our
Ourproposed
proposed work
work will
will be
beable
abletoto work
workwith
with any
any
of
of these
these models.
models. Now
Now let
let us
us examine
examine how
how IMRQ
IMRQ can
can be
be
evaluated.
evaluated.

4.2 Evaluation
Evaluationof
ofIMRQ
IMRQ
4.2
Given aa MRQ
MRQ and
and aa cloaked
cloaked location
location Ui(t),
U i ( t )computing
,computing
Given
coi~esponding
IMRQinvolves
involves two
twomain
main steps:
steps:
its cOlTesponding
its
IMRQ
I.I . Transfornlation
TransforniationPhase,
Phase, which
which converts
convertsthe
theMRQ
M R Qtotothe
the
IMRQ,and
and
IMRQ,

Evaluation Phase,
Phase, which
which computes
computes probabilistic
probabilistic anan2.2. Evaluation
swersfor
forthe
theIMRQ.
IMRQ.
swers

TransformationPhase.
Phase. InInMRQ,
MRQ,the
thequery
queryrange
rangeof
ofthe
the
Transformation
is
a
circle
C
with
radius
l'i
and
center
L
(t).
]f
the
user
is
a
circle
Ci
with
radius
7,
;
.
and
center
L
i
(
t
)
.
If
the
user 5Si
i
i
i

user transmits
transmits her cloaked location,
location, the query range is no
longer C;,
Ci, since
since the service provider has no idea of where
LLii(t)
L;i (t)
( t )exactly is.
is. The
The service provider does know that L
(t)
is
is within Ui(t),
Ui(t):so
so it transforms the query into sub-queries
over all
all possible locations
locations of 5,.
S,. In other words,
words, at each
E
U
(t),
a
query
is
issued
to
find
out which
point (u,
v)
( u :v) E Ui i ( t ) ,
is
users
C:(u:,l.):where C;(u,v)
C:(,u.23) is the
users are
are within the region C;(u,'r),
circle with radius
radius r centered at (u.
(u.v).
1:).The result of IMRQ
isis essentially
essentially the union of the results
results of the range queries
issued
Ui(t).
( t ) .The transformation potentially
issued at
at each point in U;
covers more objects than MRQ. In Figure 3,
3, for example,
the
the converted ranges in (b)
(b) overlap with {52.
(S2. 53,
S 3S.od
S4)while
the
the original
original query
query in (a)
(a) only covers
covers 54.
S4.
Evaluation Phase.
Phase. Since
Since the location of each object
is
is uncertain,
uncertain, each user only has some
some chance of satisfying
ing the
the IMRQ.
IMRQ. in particular, if 5Sj
€ F
F,,:
j E
i , then the prob(u, v)
ability
pj(u:
v ) of user 5Sj
Si's request at point
ability Pj
j satisfying 5i'S
(u,
v)
(u.
v) EE U
Ui i(t)
( t )isis given by

PJ ( u .v ) =

Area(U, (f,)

n C:(71.

Area(Uj ( t j ))

(2)

<

c;

=
-

I.

A ••

ruea

. U.;(t.)

IJUT
Vi

(+,
(t)

1
(l

p, (u. u)dudv

.( ))Pj(u.v)dudv
u,t

Area(U, (t,)
Area(Uj(tj)

Input
T
</D. urlcerrairig:
uncertain I)' regiori>
region> of
of all users *I
"/
T /" relation containing <ID,
S;, U;(t)
I" idenlity
identity and uncertainty region of
of user S,
S; "/
"/
Si:
U i ( t )/"
F;. I.;
7'; /"
I" parameters of
of lMRQ
IMRQ for user Si
S; */
"/
F,.
M 1/". resolu~ion
resolution of
of lMRQ
IMRQ "/
"/
Al

Output

(Sj,pj)
r names and probabilities
probabilities of
of users that satisfi es lMRQ
IMRQ */
"/
(Sj.pi) /:"narnes

Transformation Phase
I.
M equal subregions.
subregions.
1. Divide U;(t)
Ui ( t ) into Al
2. Let q,,,
q", (7n
(m -= 1I,. ..... . :, .If)
M) be the midpoint of
of the in,-th
moth subregion.
3. Let I
I be a relation with attributes
allributes <user-tinme,
<user-name, region>.
4.
for m +
<-- 1....
4.form
I . . . . :, !If
A f do
do

a.
m-th I-ow
row of
of I be < Si.
S;. C:(midpoint
C; (midpoint ofof in-th
moth subregion)
a. Let the in-th

>

(1))

where
where tj
t j ::; t isis the time instant of the latest value of U
U,:
j ,
and
and U
U,(tj)nC,'(u:
is the common region between U
Uj j(tj)
(tj)
j (t j ) n C; (u, v) is
and
(u, v).
and C;
C:(u,,
v). For simplicity,
simplicity, we assume U
U,(t,)
=U
U,j (t).1
(t).'
j (t J) =
Essentially,
(u, v)
Essentially, Pj
pj(u.
v) is
is the fraction of U
Uj(f)
j (t) that overlaps
(u,,v).
21).
C;Cu.,
The
The total
total probability of 5Sj
j satisfying the IMRQ issued
by 5;
Si isis given
given by the integration of the product of the pdf
pdf of
user 5;'s
and
Pj(u,
v)
Si's location
location at (u,
( u :v)
v ) (i.e., Area~u;(t)))
)
pj(u:
T!)
Area(c!,(t))
over all
all (11,
(11.: v)
v ) EG U;
Ui(t).
( t ) .Therefore,
Pj

<user-name,
region>, which stores the identity and the ge<user-riarne, regiorl>,
uncertainty region of
of all users. Figometry of the current uncertainty
ure 4 describes an evaluation algorithm for IMRQ.

C:(?L.
v))dudu
nn C;
(11, v))dudv

Area(
Ui (t)
)Area( Uj (t
Area(U,
(t))Area(U,
( tj))
,))

(3)

Evaluation Phase
S. Let V
allributes < user-tinme,prob
user-name,prob >.
>.
5.
V be a relation with attributes
6.
following
6. Evaluate the follow
in^ query:

INSERT INTO V VALUES
lNSERT
Area(lntersection(1.7'egion, T.region))lArea(T.region)
Tregion))/ Area (Tregion)
(SELECT
(SELECT TID.
T.1D. Area(Intersection(I.7-egion,
FROM II,T
:T
Overlaps(l.7'egion,
T7'egion)
WHERE Overlaps(I
.region, T.~egion)
AND ].ID
T.ID
I.ID <> TID
(T.ID INTERSECT Fi)
Fi) <>
< > NULL;
AND (T.ID
7. Evaluate the following query:
ID, SUM(prob)
SUM(pTOb)
SELECT ID.
FROM V
I,'
GROUPBY ID;

(4)

p j (v.,
(u.:
v) with Equation 2.
2. The probability
by substituting Pj
v)
value
computed serves
serves as
as an indication of the confidence
value so
so computed
placed on the answer.
answer. For example,
example, in Figure 3(b), P2
p:! is
0.1, showing
showing that 52
S2isis unlikely to be answer,
answer, while 53
S3
only 0.1,
and 54
S4have a much higher chance (0.5
(0.5 and 0.9 respectively)
and
answers.
of being the answers.

4.3 Query
Query Implementation
4.3
We now address the implementation issues of IMRQ
lMRQ preWe
section.
sented in the last section.
We assume the service
service provider maintains a spatialWe
telnporal database system for
for storing the location informatemporal
tion of each user.
user. Let TT be a relation with two attributes
~ h possible
e
locationsof
IIThe
locations
of 5S,J at time tt may be derived from the location
at tj
ti if the
the maximum
~naxirnulnspeed of 5Sjj isis known.
known. We investigate
investigate this issue in
at
Section 7.
7.
Section

Figure 4. Evaluating an IMRQ.
Figure
In this algorithm, the first four steps correspond
correspond to the
Transformation Phase.
and 2 partition U
i ( t )into
Phase. Steps 1land
U;(t)
hf subregions, where Ad
111
11-1 is called "resolution"
"resolution" and is a parameter that controls the precision of
of the query answer. The
range query region formed by each midpoint of
of the subregion is inserted to relation II (Steps 3 and 4).
In the Evaluation Phase, a spatial-join using the Overlaps predicate is performed between the range query region
of I
I and the uncertainty
uncertainty region of
of T
T (i.e., the tuple pairs that
have non-zero overlap are joined
I 81). These joined
joined [[18]).
joined tuples
correspond to users that satisfy any of
of the queries formed
by the midpoints of
of the subregions. Out of
of these join
join pairs,
of F,
Pi are
only the identities of
of users who are the members of
inserted, together with their probabilities (Equation 2), to
relation V (Steps 5 and 6). Notice that the lritersectiori
Intersection

function evaluates the geometry of the common region of
Area function returns the area
two given regions, while the At-eo
of a given region, which can be computed using well known
algorithms from the spatial database literature [18].
[ I 81. Finally,
Step 7 sums up
LIPall the probability values that belong to the
same user in the relation 17,
V:corresponding to Equation 4. It
returns the identity and probability of each user that satisfying the IMRQ.
This algorithm can be implemented by PL/SQL
PLISQL and any
spatial database system that supports the Overlap
Overlop join, 111It?tersection
Area. Also,
Also: for presentation purpose, we perter-section and Areo.
form two queries in Steps 6 and 7,
7 : but they may be comcombined into a single query for efficiency.
Complexity.
Complexity. Steps II to 4 take 0(111)
O ( A l ) times. The
O ( J I n ) times and Step 7 needs
worst case of Step 6 needs 0(11171)
0(11171)
O(A4n.) times. Thus the complexity of the algorithm is
O(AI + 11171
A l n + Afn)
= 0(1I1n).
O(i1ln). In practice, many effieff0(111
Mn) =
cient spatial join techniques based on z-ordering trees and
R-trees [18}
[I%]can significantly improve
inlprove the cost of evaluation.
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R
i
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L

jER,I\joji

IpJ -

0.51
0.5

(6)

(Tj:
p,) returned by an IMRQ
where R,
R , is the set of tuples (T
j ,Pj)
Si.
for Si.
Metrics for quantifying the quality of answers exist for
other queries like nearest-neighbor
nearest-neighbor and SUM, and readers
[3] for more details. Also notice that the
are referred to [3]
quality defined here depends on the location data of users
being queried. Next, we present quality metrics due to the
uncertainty of the query issuer herself
herself.

5.2 Quality Due to Query Imprecision
Recall from the Evaluation Phase that the answer to
IMRQ is in fact the union of the answers to the sub-queries
(u, v)),
executed over the uncertainty region
(with range C:(u,
7)):
of the query issuer Si.
Si. Out of these range queries, only one
is correct. The union operation can potentially produce incorrect answers (called false
false positives in [16)),
[16]): due to the
imprecision
in~precisionof the location of the query issuer. Here we
present a metric for computing quality of an answer due to
the uncertainty of the IMRQ.
IMRQ.
Let us assume that each sub-query returns a set of an( wv).
21). Also, suppose there are m
m distinctive reswers Q :(u,
R , , l : . . . . Ri,m,
Ri.,, for all the sub-queries. Let R i, be
sults, Ri,l,""
the set of identities returned by IMRQ, and thus R ii ==
UZ~l
p(Ri,d be the probability that R
UP'
,, RRi.l-.
Ri.k
i .k · Let p(R,,h.)
i .k is the
true result. Then p(Ri.k)
p( Ri,k) is also the probability that user Si
Si
gets the answer Ri,k:
Ri.k:

c:

Quality of Imprecise Queries

Due to the inherent imprecision in location data and the
query itself, an imprecise query returns probabilistic answers.
swers. In this section we try to answer the question: how
ambiguous is an answer')
answer? We investigate the notion of quality of imprecise queries,
queries. which can serve as a hint for the
query issuer on whether she should adjust the degree of her
location uncertainty.
uncertainty. There are two types of quality metrics:
one due to the inexactness of data, and the other one due to
the ambiguity of the a query.

5.1

The value of Equation 5 varies between 0 to 1,
1, with a larger
doro
value representing a better quality.
quality. We can define the data
score of an IMRQ as the average of the values evaluated in
Equation 5 for all objects that satisfy the IMRQ:

Quality Due to Data Imprecision

The first factor that produces answer uncertainty is the
ambiguity of cloaked location data.
data. This ambiguity is reflected by the probability of the query answer.
answer. Here we
modify the metric for probabilistic query range queries described in [3,
131.
[3, 13).
For example, for an IMRQ, the result is the clearest if
we are sure that Sj
Sj is either completely
coinpletely inside or outside the
query range; Pj
p j equal to 100%
100% and 0% respectively. Uncertainty arises when we are less than 100%
100% sure whether the
location of Sj
Sj is inside the query range. This corresponds to
the case when the uncertainty region of Sj,
S j , i.e., Uj(t), only
lies partially inside Si'S
S i 7 squery range. The most ambiguous
an~biguous
case happens when Pj
p j is 0.5 i.e., Sj
Sj has a half chance of
being inside the range. Hence a reasonable metric for measuring the quality of an answer due to PJ
p, is:

Q:

(7)

pdf over all points
that is, the integration of uniform pdf
in U
U,(t)
R,.k. Note that
i (t) that evaluate the same result Ri,k.
L~~=l p(R2.k)
p(Ri,k) == 1.
CY==,
1.
We also define the precisiorz
precision of R with respect to R,,ARUe as
V(R _) = IRi,kl

IRil

1.k

(8)

V(R,,k)
"impurities" inwhere V(R
i . k ) indicates the amount of "impurities"
jected to R
Rz.k
R7.k
jected
i . k assuming R
i . k is the correct answer. Note
I, with a higher value indicatthat V(Ri,k)
V ( R z , k )varies from 0 to 1,
ing a higher precision.
The query score of IMRQ can then be measured by
m
TTL

Ipj - 0.51

0.5

(5)

Si== LP(Ri.k,)V(Ri./.')
~ ( R ~ . ~ ) v ( R ~ .(9)
(9)
~)
Query score for Si
k=l
k=l

0.4

• R'.2={S3}
• P(R,.2)=O.3
• V(R1.2l=1/4

• R1.1={S2,S3}
• p(R1.1)=O.4
• V(R,.,)=1/2

• R1.3={S3,S4,SS}
• p(Ru}=O.3
• V(Ru}=3/4

reduce her uncertainty region only ifif there is an improvement of the data score. Notice that as the query results are
obtained by sampling over the uncertainty
uncertainty region. rerunning
the query with a smaller uncertainty region ineans
means reusing
the results of
of a subset of
of sampling points over the uncertainty region. Hence the server may be able to compute the
new query incrementally.

6 Experimental Results
R1 = {Sz,S3,S',,S5)
Figure
Figure 5.
5. Illustrating the query score of IMRQ.

We have performed an extensive simulation study on the
present the simulabehavior of location cloaking. Here we present
tion model, followed by experimental results.

6.1
which varies between 0 (lowest quality) and 1I (highest
quality).
quality). To
To understand this
this metric,
metric, let us look at Figure
ure 5,
5 , which shows
shows three
three distinct answers
answers for query issuer
51,
S1, and
and also
also the probability that 51
S1yields each of the answer
swer (i.e., the fraction
fraction of VI
U l(t)
( t ) that yields the answer).
Since
S1isis located at only one point in U 1l ((t),
t ) , only one
Since 51
of
correct. Suppose R
R1,3
of the
the three
three answers
answers is
is COlTect.
u is correct.
Then
Then its
its precision V(R
\/(R1.3)
314; since 52
Spis a false posu ) is 3/4,
itive.
p(R1.3) is
is the probability that 51
SI gets
itive. The
The value p(R1.3)
the
Rl,s,
is 0.3.
0.3. The query score of this
the answer
answer R
u , which is
IMRQ is
is thus
thus the weighted sum
sun1 of the V(Ru-)'s,
V ( R I . k ) ' ~that
, is.
IMRQ
0.3 - $ =
= 0.5.
0.5.
0.4 .. ~!j + 0.3
0.3 .. + 0.3
0.4
Implementation
Implementation of Query
Query Score. Similar to the transformation
formation phase of IMRQ,
IMRQ, the query score
score is computed by
A sampling points from
from Vi
U,(t).
first getting
getting !If
first
(t). The query reA4 points are then
sults of the
the range query for
for each of the 111
sults
to their query answers. Equation 7 is
grouped according to
sin~plyequal to the fraction
fraction of a total of M
Ad points that
then simply
share the
the same
same set of objects in their query answers. Due to
share
the limitation
limitatioil of space,
space, we omit the algorithm details.
the

+

t+

'1

5.3 Managing
Managing Answer Quality
Quality
5.3
The answer
answer quality metrics
nletrics allow a user to trade-off
trade-off priThe
vacy for
for a potentially better answer quality. In particular,
particular.
the query
query score
score depends
depends on the size of the uncertainty rethe
gion -- a larger uncertainty region potentially yields more
gion
distinct answers and lower query scores.
scores. Therefore,
Therefore, a low
distinct
score indicates that the user may reduce the size of
query score
uncertainty region and resubmit the query.
query.
her uncertainty
iinHowever, reducing uncertainty region size may not imHowever,
prove the
the data score,
score, since it depends on the uncertainty of
the cloaked location information of other users that cannot
the
be controlled by the query issuer herself. To see whether the
improved as
as a result of shrinking uncertainty
data score
score is
is improved
data
region, the
the server can use the same
same cloaked location proregion,
the user and re-evaluate the query with a smaller
vided by the
region. The server then suggests
suggests to the user to
uncertainty region.
uncertainty

Simulation Model

Param

I Default II Meaning
City Simulator parameters

I

Location update rate (sec' 1 )
Start threshold
Fill threshold
Empty threshold
Einpty
#of
# of moving objects
Max samples skipped before ~.ecordine
recording
Location cloaking parameters
of query
150
( Radius of
of uncerlainty
uncertainty repon
region
Radius of
20
4499
Sampl~ng
Sampling size

5,000
0.15
T Sta 1't
0.09
Tfill
0.5
Tempty
Ternpt y
100
Nobj
N,,,,,
Nre/a.x 1 2000
.Au

1

T

Ui(t).l·
U , ( t ) 7.
31
M

1

11

1

Table 1. Parameters and baseline values.
Our experiments are based upon data generated by the
City Simulator 2.0 [12] developed independently at IBM.
The City Simulator simulates the realistic motion of
of Nobj
N obj
people moving in a city. The input to the simulator is a map
of a city. We used the sample map provided
provided with the simulator that models a city of
of size 8.10
840 x 1260 square units, with
7 1 buildings, 48 roads, six road intersections and one park.
71
Each building is three-dimensional and contains a number
number
of floors. The simulator models the movement of
of objects
within the buildings and on the roads and park. To generate
reasonable movement and occupation of
of buildings, the simulator keeps track of two conditions based on parameters
Trilland Tempty.
T,,,,,t,. The simulator ensures that the fraction of
Trill
of
people at the ground level lies between
between Trill
Trill and Te,,,t,.
Tempty.
Each object reports its location to the server at an average rate of A,
,. Before recording the simulation results, the
A".
Nrelax
simulator enters a warm-up phase, where at most N,,,,,
samples for each object are generated, or at least Tstart
Tstart of
of
the population are at the ground level of
of buildings. Next:
Next,
the simulator records the location updates of
of each object in
a trace file,
file, which contains the timestamp of
of the update and
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the spatial coordinates of the object at that time. The trace
file serves as the data source for our experiments.
experiments.
An IMRQ is generated by randomly
randon~lychoosing a user as
the query issuer. The IMRQ has a range of radius T.
r. Each
(t).
T.
A samuser has an uncertainty region of radius U
Ui(t).r.
i
Iv1 is used to implement the IMRQ evaluation
pling size of Ad
algorithm.
The City Simulator is implemented in Java and runs [Inunder Windows XP. The simulation and cloaking agent program is written in C++, and the testbed is run on a UNIX
server.
server. Each data point is the average value over 200 location update cycles. We use the radius of uncertainty region
as a measure of the location privacy of user -- a larger radius implies a higher degree of privacy. Since we are interested in the interaction between privacy and service quality, our experiments use the IMRQ's query score as the primary metric of quality, the value of which can be adjusted
by changing the resolution of the cloaked location. Table II
illustrates the parameters of the simulation model.

6.2 Results
Quality
Quality and Performance. We first decide experimen·
experin~en

30

tally the number of sampling points for the uncertainty region,
A f , that gives us the highest quality with the lowest
gion; 111,
evaluation cost. Figure 6 shows the results for some combinations of privacy value, query size and number of users.
When more sampling points are llsed,
used, the quality increases
7,9).
(due to the increase in value of P(Rik)
P ( R ~ in
. ~Equations
)
The rate of increase drops when Ai
Ad is larger than 49.
49. We
therefore choose )\1
!I1 to be 49 in other experiments.
In Figure 7 we see that an increase in privacy value
lengthens the execution time of IMRQ. With a higher privacy (or uncertainty region of the query issuer), the ranges
of sub-queries cover a larger area. Thus more objects are incon~putation,resulting in a higher execution time.
volved in computation,
We remark that an IMRQ needs little time to complete in
our experiments; for example, it takes only 25ms for an
IMRQ with a privacy radius of 25 units.
Quality
Quality and Privacy.
Privacy. We investigate the effect of location privacy on query score of the IMRQ. Figure 8 shows the
result for different number of users. The quality is I1 (highest) when there is no privacy at all. As privacy (i.e., uncertainty region area) increases, the query score drops. This is
because the larger uncertainty region increases the number
of distinct query answers, thereby lowering the query score.
An interesting observation is that the query score does
not drop linearly. This is due to the fact that the data distribution is not uniform. When an object enters a building, it
can spend some time traveling around different floors
floors of the
building before going out. As a result, many moving objects are clustered in a fixed area (buildings) rather than being scattered on roads. As explained before, an increase in
uncertainty region of the query issuer creates more distinct
i~ncertainty
answer sets,
sets. When her uncertainty region starts to overlap
a densely-populated region (i.e., a building), a slight expansion of her uncertainty region can generate many different
distinct answer sets, due to the inclusion of many location
data during this expansion. Thus we can see a sharper drop
at some
seine regions of the curve. On the contrary, when the un-
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certainty region starts to cover the road:
road, the drop is much
slower because the population density on the roads is lower.
We also observe the difference in quality when the number of users varies. In general, for the same privacy value,
a larger population produces a lower score,
score: since more distinct answer sets are produced. The reason why the quality
N obj =
N obj =
for Nobj
= 100
100 is slightly better than Nobj
= 10
10 when privacy is less than 20
2 0 is again due to non-uniform distribution
of location data.
Nobj =
= 10,
10: the query issuer chosen
data. At Nobj
is located in a denser area than the case for N
ATobj
= 100.
100.
obj =
Thus an increase in privacy value has a stronger effect on
N obj =
= 10
10 than when N
A:,1,obj == 100.
100.
the quality when Nobj
We can conclude that the query score is sensitive to the
density of the region covered by the cloaked location.
location. If
the region is highly dense, a slight increase in uncertainty
region can reduce the quality significantly. This observation
can be useful to the cloaking agent. For example,
example, it may
advise the user not to further reduce the spatial resolution
of her location if she is in a crowded area.
The quality continues to decrease (slowly) when the uncertainty radius further increases. The dropping rate is
much slower because the uncertainty region covers most of
the objects, and so there is not much difference in the answer sets. The quality drop is mostly due to the reduction
of the pdf
pdf at each point in the uncertainty region, and in turn
the value of Equation 7. Due to space limitation we do not
show the detailed results here.
Quality and Query Size. Next, we study the effect of
query size on answer quality. Figure 9 illustrates the results:
sults: the answer quality increases with query size. With
a fixed privacy value (uncertainty radius), a continuous increase in the query size will not create many distinct answer sets. When the query range has a very large radius
(160)
( 160) compared with the uncertainty radius (20), the query
ranges created will render many similar answers, since the
difference in the queries at different points in the uncertainty
region is relatively small. At a larger radius (30),
(30): the rela-

Figure
10. Increasing
I n c r e a s i n g linkability with
w i t h the
t h e last
last
F i g u r e 10.
location
l o c a t i o n record.

tive difference between the uncertainty size and privacy is
smaller than when the radius is 20, and thus the quality is
lower too.
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Protecting Linkability Against Trajectory
Tracing

Before we can claim that cloaking safeguards location
privacy, there is one final puzzle left to be solved -- preventing the use of trajectories for inferring locations. Suppose
the service provider saves all the cloaked locations it received. Also assume the maximum speed of the movement
of the user is known, which can be obtained through the
user, etc. We
movement history, the vehicle owned by the user.
now show that it is possible for the service provider (or atuser's identity with
tacker) to increase the linkability of a user's
her locations, even when it has been cloaked by the user.
Specifically, let the maximum speed of a certain user be

V,,,,,.Assume the user sent her last cloaked location at

v,nax.

Lo> i.e., U(to),
U ( t o ) ,and then again after T time units, i.e.,
time to,
U(to
U ( t o+ T).
T). Using V,max
,,, , it is possible to derive the bound
T (called maximum
enclosing the user's
user's location at time to+
to+T
rnaxitnutn
bound),
bo~tt74,as shown in Figure 10.
10. Even if the user says she
is located somewhere in U (to
( t o+
+ T),
T ) , her possible location
is actually limited within the overlapping region between
U(to
maximum bound, which is smaller than
U(Lo+ T)
T ) and the niaxinium
U (to
( t o+ T).
T ) . The Iinkability
linkability between the user and the locations is thus higher than she expected. Notice that this is an
accumulative effect
effect, since the service provider can derive a
smaller bound based on the overlapping region. We propose
delaying, in order to
two techniques, called patching and delaying,
solve this important problem.

U(to+T+6r) = U(to+n
U'(to+n = U(to)

U
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Figure 11. Linkability protection techniques
by (a) patching, and (b) delaying.

7.1

Patching and Delaying

The first idea of preventing Iinkability from being increased is to combine the cloaked locations released in the
past with the current cloaked location before it is sent. We
call this technique patching. Figure II(a) illustrates this
concept. At time 10 + T, in place of U(to + T), the region
U'(to + T) = U(to) U U(to + T) is sent. The increase in
linkability due to trajectory tracing, or "loss" of uncertainty
in U(to + T), is thus "compensated" by the inclusion of
U(t o), which is assured to be within the maximum bound.
Essentially, the spatial accuracy of the location is further relaxed. Notice that this may cause a degradation in query
score due to the increase in uncertainty.
Another technique is based on relaxing the timing requirement, which we temled "delaying". The idea is to
suspend the request until the cloaked location fits into the
maximum bound. As shown in Figure II (b), U (to + T) is
not sent until after 6t. more time units, when U(t o + T) is
guaranteed to be within the maximum bound. The advantage of this scheme over patching is that the extent of the
cloaked location remains unchanged and so the query score
is not affected. However, the response time of the query
can be increased due to the delay introduced, which can be
an important Quality-of-Service parameter in time-critical
applications.
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Related Works

The idea of cloaking location information has been recently proposed by Gruteser et a1.[7] for anonymous applications. In their model, each tuple (x, Y, t) (i.e., location
(x, y) at time t) is transformed to ([Xl. X2], [Yl, Y2], [t 1, t2])
where ([Xl,X2].[Yl,Y2]) is the rectangular area within
which (x, y) is found, between tile time interval [t 1, t 2 ]. To
measure the degree of privacy introduced by cloaking, they

propose a metric called k-anonymity, which measures between time interval [t1, t2] the number of users, k, at the
same spatial vicinity ([Xl, X2], [Y1, Y2]).
Another work that uses the k-anonymity metric is found
in [2], where pseudonymous applications are studied. The
authors use a middleware to rename pseudonyms, so that a
user's identity cannot be traced. Moreover, this renaming is
done while there are at least k users in the same zone at the
same time period.
The k-anonymity metric has several problems. First, the
scheme may not be used if there are fewer than k users in
the system. Secondly, even if there are more than k users,
they may span in a large area over an extended time period,
in which case the cloaked location can be very large and
cause a severe degradation of service quality. Thirdly, algorithms using this metric assume a trusted middleware which
collects information from all users. It may present a performance bottleneck and face the risk of being compromised.
It is also not clear how k-anonymity can be applied to nonanonymous applications, since it measures the anonymity
of a user, while in non-anonymous application the identity
of the user is already known. We suggest the level of privacy of cloaked location be measured by the the uncertainty
region size and the entropy of uncertainty pdf, independent
of the number of users inside the uncertainty region.
As far as we know, few papers study location privacy in
non-anonymous applications. A recent paper by Gruteser et
al. [8] proposes the idea of classifying a map into sensitive
and non-sensitive areas. Further, every k sensitive areas are
clustered into a partition. When a user enters a partition, her
location updates are not released until she left the partition,
provided that she had not entered any sensitive area while
she was inside the partition. In this scheme, if the k sensitive
areas are close to each other, it is still easy to guess that
the user has entered one of the sensitive areas. In addition,
there is no guarantee that there are enough sensitive areas
to be clustered. Moreover, service quality is not considered,
which can be seriously affected due to delay and omission
of location infomlation.
To our best knowledge, there is no previous work on relating the effect of location cloaking with service quality.
We proposed in the position paper [5] a framework to balance the uncertainty injected to a location and quality of
service. Here we study this idea in more detail, and present
a solution for supporting IMRQ, a typical example of nonanonymous queries.
Another idea for querying private data is to use encrypted
databases. Recently, Hore et al. [II] discussed a privacypreserving index for querying range queries over encrypted
data. To the best of our knowledge, these techniques only
work for specific query operators. Also, the feasibility of
those schemes depend on the strength of encryption. Our
method does not need encryption and can be easily extended

to work with other queries.
In (4], the idea of using an uncertainty model to cap'ture the imprecision of moving objects (due to the measurement and sampling error) is proposed. That model is
a generalized version of the one presented here, where the
uncertainty can change with time and the pdf within the uncertainty region can be non-unifonn. That paper also presented algorithms for probabilistic nearest-neighbor queries
over different object movement models. In [3], we studied
other types of probabilistic queries, such as range queries
and aggregate queries, and also defined notions of answer
quality for them. The main difference between probabilistic
queries and imprecise queries is that the information about
the query issuer in probabilistic queries is exact. which may
not be the case for imprecise queries. For instance, in the
imprecise moving range query model, the query issuer's location is uncertain rather than exact. This calls for new evaluation algorithms and quality notions for imprecise queries.
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Conclusions

Location privacy is an important and emerging topic. To
allow a user more flexibility in controlling her privacy, the
idea of injecting uncertainty to sanitize location information
has been proposed recently. However, those schemes did
not consider the quality and accuracy of services provided,
and it was not clear how the cloaked infonnation can be
queried. We suggested a framework to connect privacy, information cloaking and service quality. We proposed imprecise queries, which hide the identity of the query issuer and
enable evaluation of cloaked information. We studied an
evaluation algorithm and quality metrics of moving range
queries, and showed how they can be implemented conveniently using spatial-database technologies. We performed
an extensive simulation to investigate behavior of the proposed scheme. We also presented techniques to protect linkability of cloaked information against trajectory tracing.
There are interesting avenues for future work. We would
like to build a software system for the cloaking agent. We
want to examine how our proposed metric for location
cloaking can be applicable to anonymous and pseudonymous applications. We will also investigate other kinds
of imprecise queries such as nearest-neighbor and average
queries.
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